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ONCENTRAT1ON measures indicate the extent
to which some specific magnitude, such as total de-
posits, sales or capacity, is controlled by one or a few
decision-making units in a market. At the firm level,
which is the focus ofthis study, concentration depends
on the number offirms in the market and theirrelative
sizes. Accordingly, the fewer the banking organiza-
tions in a local commercial bankingmarket or the more
unevenlydeposits are distributed among agiven num-
ber of organizations within a market, the higher the
concentration in that market.
may be proposed to monitor or inodif~’market per-
formance.
The concentration of total deposits among banking
organizations in 176 Eighth District local commercial
banking markets is described in this study.3 Also de-
scribed is the distribution ofobserved levels ofconcen-
tration according to a recently published Department
of Justice criterion for classifying markets as highly
concentrated, moderately concentrated and uncon-
centrated. Finally, the effects on concentration due to
The degree of market concentration is important
because it may affect the overall “performance” ofthe
market — the extent to which firms in the market act
independently, aggressively adopt new technologies,
provide desired types and levels of services and carry
out other activities that benefit buyers, suppliers and
others. While the existence of a systematic link be-
tween concentration and performance is open to de-
bate, there are many, including the U.S. Department
ofJustice, who believe that a high level of concentra-
tion in a market will affect the market’s performance
adversely.2 Thus, if a market is characterized as being
highly concentrated, sonicform ofpolicy intervention
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‘Concentration also can he measured at the plant level.
2
The Department of Justice, in its June 1982 merger guidelines,
noted that:
Otherthings being equal. concentration affects tlsc likelihood that one
firm, or a snsall grot p of firnss, could successfully exercise market
power. The smallerthe percentage oftotal stipp
1
v that a finncontrols.
tlse more severelyit ,sssist restrict its own outputin order to prodi cc’ a
given price increase’. a,icI tlse lcsslikely it is that an output restriction
will he profitable. Where collective action is neeessarv, anadditional
constrast applies. As the nuinberoffirnis necessary to control a given
pereestage of total aupph- increases, cIsc dibEciilties and costs of
reaching and eniorcing consensus with respect to the cssistrol tsf tlsat
stipply also ilserease.
U.S. Department ofJustice, “Merger Guidelines,” federal Regis-
ter (June 30, 1982), p. 28497.
For more on the conccntration—perforrnanee relatiotsslsip, see
Donald H. Fraser and Peter S. Rose, ‘Banking Structure and
Perlbrmance in Isolated Markets: The lsnplieatiosss for Public Pol-
icy,” The Antitrust Bulletin (Fall 1972), pp. 927—47; Arnold ,k.
Heggestad and Jolsis J. Mingo, “Prices, Nonpriees, and Concentra—
tissn in Commercial Batsking, JournalofMoney, Credit and Bank-
ing (February 1976). pp. 107—17; Ahnarin Plsillips, “Competition,
Confusioss, and Comisiercial Ranking,” The Journal of Finance
(March 1964), pp. 32—45; atsd Thomas H. Saving, “Coueeistration
Ratios atsd the Degree of Monopoly,’’ International Economic
Review (Fehruary 1970), pp. 139—46.
3
Banking organizatiosss included in the study are ussit banks, multi-
bank holdingcompanies and branch bassking organizations. Chaiss
banking relationships arisingthrough common ownei’ship or man—
agement interlocks are not cosssidered due to slata litnitatiosss,
Thus, observed levels of cosse’esstration nsav smnderstate the effec-
tive degree of control in particular markets.
For other studies of the relationships ainotsg banking organiza-
tions issthe EighthDistrict, see Gerald P. Dwyer. Jr.. amsd William
C. Nihlack, ‘‘Branching, Holding Cosnpanies, asscl Ranking Con-
centration in tlse Eighth District, this Recieiv (July 1974), PP.
11—23; Ross NI. Robertson, ‘The Strstctum’e of Banking us tlse
EighthDistrict: Branches assd Mergers,” this Reciew (April 1956),
pp. 45—51; and Ross NI. Robertson, ‘‘The Structure of Baisking iss
the Eighth District: Chaisss, Crotsps amsd lntem’industry Cotsspeti—
tion,” this Renew (October 1956), pp. 113—21.
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demand in local commercial banking markets, differ-
ences in state laws allowing branching and multibank
holding companies, and physical space within local
markets are considered.
The study is divided into three sections: First, defi-
nitions and the measure of concentration are intro-
duced. Second, the concentration of total deposits
among banking organizations in local comniercial
banking markets is reported and analyzed.4 A sum-
mary and conclusions are then presented.
THE 1HEASUREMENT OF
CONCENTRATION
Concentration and the Definition of
Relevant Commercial Banking Markets
Market boundaries separate sellers who compete
directly from those with whom there is no directcom-
petition. Consequently, the measure ofconcentration
in a market depends in a critical way on the manner in
which the boundaries of the market are defined. All
else equal, the more narrowly defined the market, the
higher the measured concentration fora specific num-
ber of firms.
The definition of a market’s boundaries depends on
two considerations: the products that are judged to be
close substitutes and the geographic space over which
the producers of those products compete for the same
buyers.” In this study, the product analyzed is com-
4
Deposits in banking organizatiosss in the 176 observed markets are
evaluated as ofJune 30, 1981, andcome to $51.31 billion, or86.99
percesatofthe $58.98billion total deposits in the EighthDistrict on
that date. The balance of the deposits is from areas within the
Eightls District where specific markets were ssot defined, Foreign
deposits are not included in the calculation of total deposits.
Total deposit data are from “Report of Condition,” June 30,
1981, and ‘Sssmmaryof Deposits,”June 30, 1981. compiled by the
Federal Deposit lissurance Corporation. Data on multihank hold-
ing companies and branch relatimss are from “Bank and Branch
Structure File,” Jusse 30, 1981, compiled by the Board of Gov-
ernors ofthe Federal Reserve System from secondary sources,
5
For studies treating market definition criteria, see Deane Carson
and Paul NI. Horvitz, “Concentration Ratios and Competition,”
The .Vational Banking Reciew (September 1963), pp. 105—10;
Stephen A. Rhoades, Stnwture-Perfonnanee Studies in Banking:
A Summary and Evalaation, Staff Economic Studies 92 (Board of
Covem-nors of the Federal Reserve System, 1977); Michael E.
Trebing, “The New Bank-Thrift Competition: Will It Affect Bank
Acquisition and Merger Analysis?” this Review (February 1981),
pp. 3—11; and David 0. Whitehead, ‘Relevant Geographic Bank-
ing Markets: How Should They Be Defined?’ Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta Economic Review (January/February 1980), pp.
20—28.
mercial banking services. While this specification is
narrower than if thrifts were included, it is chosen
because comnmercial banking, considered as aseparate
line of commerce, is the point of reference in court
decisions and Federal Reserve System guidelines that
affect bank market concentration.6
The geographic boundaries ofmarkets in this study
are those established by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis in its analysis ofbank holding company and
hank merger applications. A frequent alternative to
this approach is to define banking markets along coun-
ty or_Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)
lines. This alternative, however, is rejected under the
assumption that market boundaries need not coincide
with political boundaries.8
fl.e Selection of a Concentration Measure
Once the relevant markets are defined, the concen-
tration measure must be selected and its quantitative
value obtained for each market.
Because concentration measures are based on the
behavior of a single variable, such as capacity, value
added or sales, the results and rankings obtained using
one variable may differ from those obtained using
another. This is especially a problem when dealing
with commercial banks, which are multiproduct firms
°Forexample, in a Board of Governors memo on the consideration
of thrifts in competitive analysis, it was concluded that:
The present general framework of conspetitive analysis shosmld con-
tinue, with initial consideration always of cssmpetitive effects on the
structure and performance ofcommercial banking alone,
Letter, William W. Wiles, Associate Director, Division ofBanking
Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, to the officers in charge of Examinations, Legal,
and Research Departments at all Federal Reserve Banks, June 25,
1950.
For examples and explanations of the courts’ definition ofcom-
mercial bankingas a separate line ofcommerce, see United States
Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355—57 (1963);
United States v. Connecticut NationalBank, 418 U.S. 656, 660—66
(1974); and United States v. First National State Baneorporation,
499 F. Supp. 793, 799-801, 810—11 (l).N.J. 1980).
7
For a summary of alternative geographic market definitions in
banking structore-performance studies, see Rhoades, Struc-
ture-Pemfornsance Studies, appendix table.
8
The distinction between the county/SMSA market defisaition and
the definitions smsed in this study may be naore important isa prin-
ciple than in effect. Of the 176 banking mam-kets examined, 99
(56.25 percent) coincide with single counties, 24 (13.64 percent)
coincide with two or more whole counties, and 53(30.11 percemat)
coincide with parts of individual counties, whole counties plus
parts of other counties or Ranally Metropolitan Areas.
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and thus offer a wide range of variables as potential
candidates for evaluation. This study focuses on total
deposits in commercial banks because of its impor-
tance in Federal Reserve Board policy decisions that
affect concentration in commercial banking markets.°
The concentration of total deposits in each local
market is calculated using a Herfindahl index (H-
index), which is the sum of the squared market shares
of the organizations in the market.’°Each banking
organization’s share ofa market is equalto the percent-
age of total deposits in the market that it controls.
The H-index is chosen over other concentration
measures for three reasons. First, the recently pub-
lished Department of Justice merger guidelines rely
primarily on the H-index to measure concentration.”
Second, unlike other widely used concentration mea-
sures, the H-index is explicitly sensitive to the impact
on concentration of the number of sellers in a market
and their relative sizes,’2 Third, H-index numbers
translate conveniently into “numbers-equivalents,”
which are useful for making intermarket comparisons
ofconcentration. The numbers-equivalent is the num-
her of equally sized sellers that would generate an
H-index value equal to the observed value.’3
°See,for example, orders on bankholding company easespublished
in the Federal Reserve Bulletin,
n tI
moHindex = ~ (-_±-!-)~,where td~is total deposits in the ith
i=1 TD
commercialbanking organization in a market, TI) istotal deposits
in all commercial banking organizations in that market, and ni s
the number ofbanking orgassizations in that market, The H-index
can assume a value offrom 1/n through 1. As a market becomes
more concentrated, either through a decrease in the nssmnber of
sellers or a widening issequality among a given numl,er ofsellers’
market shares, the H-index number approaches 1.
For discussions of concentration measures, see “Measures of
Banking Structure and Competitiosa,” Federal Reserve Bulletin
(September 1965), pp. 1212—2i’, and Christian Marfels, “A Bird’s
Eye View to Measures ofConcentration,” The Antitrust Bolletin
(Fall 1975). pp. 485—503.
“U.S. Department of Justice. “Merger Guidelines,” p. 28497.
saTOP level concentration measssres (e.g.: three-firm, fommr-flrm or
eight-firmconcentration ratios and curves) focus primarily on the
snarket shares ofthe largest firsus with passing, ifany, cosasidem’a-
tionofsmaller sellers in a market. Lorenzcurves measure ineqssal-
ity in the distribution of mnarket shares, with no particular refer-
ence to the numnber of sellers in a mnarket,
It shossld he noted that the greater semasitivity of the H-index
does not necessarily make it superior to other measuresofconcen-
tration. The appropriateness of any measure must be judged
according to the theoretical relationship it is describing.
t3~rhe numbers-equivalent isthe reciprocal ofthe Hem’findahl issdex
nsmtnher: 1/I-I—index.
ANALYSIS OF LOCAL MARKET
CONCENTRATION
Summary of Conce-ntration i-n Local
Commercial Banking 1.-larkets
On the basis of its H-index value, each kical com-
mercialbanking marketinthe Eighth District isplaced
into one of 15 concentration categories. These cate-
gories, along with their respective H-index value
ranges and the numbers-equivalents indicating the
least concentrated market consistent with placement
in each category, are listed in table 1, Also listed in
table 1 is the distribution of all 176 markets among
H-index categories, the distribution among categories
of markets in each state, and the distribution among
categories of markets that cross state lines. For all
markets taken together, the mode category is H4 (the
equivalent offrom 3 to 2 equal-sized banking organiza-
tions in a market), and the median is in category H5
(the equivalent of from 4 to 3 equal-sized bankiug
organizations in a market).
The extent ofconcentration in the observed banking
markets can be further categorized according to the
Department of Justice guidelines for evaluating hori-
zontal mergers. Marketswith H-index values less than
0.10 are considered to be “unconcentrated,” markets
with H-index values greater than 0.18 are considered
to be“highly concentrated,” andmarkets with H-index
values between 0.10 and 0.18 are considered to he
“moderately concentrated.”4 This categorization is
listed in the right-hand column of table 1.
Generally, as illustrated in table 1, local commercial
banking markets in the Eighth District are highly con-
centrated by the Department ofJustice criterion: over
80 percent of the markets studied fall into the highly
concentrated group. Several factors that help explain
why concentration is higher in some markets than in
others are discussed below.
“The “unconcentrated, ““moderastely concentrated” and “highly
concentrated” distinctions are based on post-merger H-index
valises. The Department ofJusticehas indicated that it is ttnlikely
to challenge mergers in markets where the post-merger H-index
value is less than0.10; unlikely to challenge mergers that increase
the Fl-index value by less than 0.01 in mnarkets where the post-
merger H-index value is between 0.10 and 0.18; and unlikely to
challenge mergers that isserease the H-index value by less than
0.965 in snarkets wherethe post-merger I-I-index value is gm-eater
than 0.18. The Department of Jsastice also has identified other
factors that areofconsequencein evaluatimag the effects oflaorizon-
tal mergers. See U.S. Department of Justice, “Merger Guide-
lines,” pp. 28496—99.
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Table 1
Distribution of Local Commercial Banking Markets Among Herfindahl Index and
Department of Justice Concentration Categories
Numoe’s-Eqmmmva’ent statns
H-lmsoex rlax:rnurn rurnoe’ at A Dept at Jtislmce
Calegory VaueRarge ‘szect’rrs Markets Ak Ii IN KY MS MO TN I, M ‘ ,, categories
F-il 1(1 ‘ 22
H2’ 0.55o56to 10 ‘.8 -
H3 05to055556 27 2 23
FM 033333 to 05 3 50 66 1 9 9 15 3 1 Highly corcertrated
H5 025to033333 4 40 6 33841’ 4 1 n4,rnaketsl
H6 02to025 5 34 58 35 9 1 3j
H? 0.lBtoO.2 5556 42 1
H8 016667to018 65 1 2 1
H9 0.14256to0 6667 / 10 2 3 1 2
F-lW Cl 12h coO 14286 85 1 2 Mooeralely concentrated
F-ill OlUim toOA2S 92 11 ~24r”arkets)
H12 0.1 toOi’lll ‘0 2
H13 008333to01 ‘2 4 1 2
H14 0 07143 to 008333 14 Urconcentralco
His 0.0625 to 0.07143 ‘6 1 ~ rnarketsl
Tolams t76 30 24 8 25 19 47 11 12
Interstate rrmarkets
“H-index . 0 55556 is the Herf noahl va’ue assocated wmth a two semier mar’et. where one semler is twice as la-ge as the other
What Factors Influence the Extent of
Concent-ratio-n?
Concentration and Demand — One factor that can
influence concentration is the level of demand in a
anarket. All other things equal, lower demand would
be expected to lead to fewer sellers and greater con-
centration in a market. Such a relationship can be
explained on efficiency grounds. Operation below
some specified level of output prevents a seller from
fully exploiting the scale economnies that allow unit
costs to fall as output increases. Such scale economies
result, for example, from the utilization of specialized
inputs, or efficiencies from consolidating previously
separate activities. The level of output at which scale
economies are exhausted (i.e., at which unit costs are
minimized) is termed the “minimum efficient scale,”
and the number ofsellers that can achieve that level of
output is influenced by the size of the snarket as mea-
sured imi terms of demand: the greater the demand in a
market, the greater the number of sellers achieving
minimum efficient scale it can accommodate. As a
result ofthis interaction between scale econosniesand
desnand, there is an upper limit on the number of
sellers which can operate at or above a minimum
efficient level of output in a market.
In this study, total population in the market is used
as a proxy for market demand: the greater the popula-
tion, the greater tlse demand. “ The distribution of
Eighth District local commercial banking markets
according to total population is shown in table 2.
To test for the effect of demand on concentration, a
simple statistical procedure is used. One hypothesis,
‘Population and related data are from 1982 Commercial Atlas and
Marketing Guide (Rand McNally amad Co., 1982), pp 94—95.
130—31, 194, 320, 374—75, 377; Rand McNally Road At/as (Rand
McNally amad Co., 1982), pp. 26—27; Bureau of the Census, 1980
Census of Fopolation, Vol. 1, Characteristics ofthe Population
(U.S. Government Primsting Office, 1982), Part 5, Arkansas, pp.
5-8, 5-33: Part 15, Illinois, pp. t5-8. 1.5-23; Part 16, Indiana, p.
16-8; Part 19. Kentucky, p. 19-8; Part26, Mississippi, p.26-8: Part
27, Missouri, p. 27-8; Part 38, Oklahoma, p. 38-8: and Part 44,
Tessnessee, p. 44-8.
It is necessary to estimate the populatiosas of markets tlaat
include parts ofcounties. For these niarkets. it is assumed that
population is distributed evenly across each relevant coumatv, so
that the proportion of a county’s physical space included isa a
market is equal to the prtsportion oF that cousaty ‘5 ~O~O latioss
isscluded in the market.
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Table 2
Distributionat Local Commercial
Banking Marketsby otal Popu!a Ion












tersned the. null ha pothesis states that H—imadex salues
in tlae 88 sanallest (least populated) markets are essen
tiallv the sasne on averact. as those for the 88 largest
(most populated) markets The. alternative h~ pothesis
isthat H-indt.x alues an the 88 leastpopul<tted markt ts
ar higher on ax rage, tlaan those for the 88 most
populated markets. Table. 3 lists the. distributions
aniong tlae 15 H-index cate.gorses of markets in the 88
least populated and 88 most populated groupings
‘Ihe null ha potlaesis as cxaluated and re.jccted using
the. chi-square. approximation of the kolmogorox-
Smirs_iox txx-o—sample test.afi This result suggests that
Th chs-square pproxsrn itsosa of the Kolsnoooro~ —Smmrno, two—
41) ~nn
asnpl t st isa n II ssher ‘ n s asad n are sanapl group
szes. as_id I) s the in xuum dafferesice h tuc( n the eosaasal sta~ (‘
frequ -sacses of th smpk. groups as snd~ st d in ass pectioma of
eachofthe c stegos-m s sma which the simple roups are coroparid
Whess tI_ic dculIts d ft st statsstsc ompam-o’d ‘, sth seIne frosn
th
5
chi square dsstrshotaon ss tI lv,ts d~ i,r esof freedom th null
h\potht is c in herejoeted at a partscsslar Its cIofcosafids necwh s_i
tI_it calcsmlated stats tic c uds the apprOprs ateb 3 fis_ied chs—
squ u-c ilue 5cc Ssdsae Smegs I \ onpa am trw Statisticsft r rIsc
& has io al Sac sac s (\lcCraw lull Book Compan~ 1956) pp
12 e—36
Table 3
Distribution of the 88 Least Populated
and 88 Most Populated Local
Commercial Banking Markets by
Herfindahi Index Category



















relatively higher levels of concentration can
pected in markets with smaller populations.
he cx-
Concentration, State Banking Laws and Market
Space — In any given market, a reorganization of
sellers that reduces their number or increases the mar-
ket share of one large firm generally increases the
H-index value fhrthat snarket. In commercialbanking,
the merging of two or anore previously competing
banks into a snultibank holding company generally
would increase concentration. Sisnilarly, an increase in
the number of branches in a market by a large bank
would increase concentration ifit draws deposits away
frona smaller banks. Thus, in principle, legislation
allowing multibank holding companies or branching
would he expected to increase coracentration.
On June 30, 1981, there were several different leg-
islative environmnents within which Eightla District
banking organizations operated. Illinois allowed
neither branching nor snultibank holding companies;
TI_ic valiseof tI_ic test statistic. usisag a os_ic—tailedtest, is 34.57 for
the 88 leastpopsalated vs. 88 most populated markets con_iparison.
At tI_ic 0.1 percent level, ti_is exceeds the clai—sqoare statisticwith
tv,’o degrees of freedom of 13.82.
19FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS OCTOBER 1983
Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky and Mississippi allowed
limited branching but not multibank holding com-
panies; Missouri allowed multibank holding com-
panies but notbranching; andTennessee allowed both
limited branching and multibank holdingcompanies.5
To test for the effect of state banking laws on local
market concentration, three market groupisags are
evaluated using multiple regression analysis. In the
first grouping, the H-index values for the 164 markets
that do not cross state lines are regressed on market
population, a multihank holding company dusnsnv
variable and a branching dummy variable. In tI_ic
second and third groupings, the H-index values for
local markets are regressed on market population, the
multihank holding company dummy variable, the
branchirag dummy variable and a “square miles” vari-
able, introduced to capture the effect on concesatration
of physical space within a market. Allelse equal, it is
expected thatthe greater thegeographic size of amar-
ket, the larger the number of firms it can accommno-
date, and the lower the concentration.
The space variable is n_ieasured in terms of square
miles of county rather than square miles ofmarket as
defined by competitive relationships. Therefore, the
second grouping is limited to the 120 Eighth District
local commercial banking markets that do not cross
state lines and that are made up of one or more whole
counties. The third grouping is composed of598 single
counties in the states encompassing the Eighth Dis-
trict, except Mississippi, for which there are inade-
quate data.Th Market areas within these states but out-
side the Eighth District are included ira tlais grouping.
It is implied in the third grouping that, in all instances,
the relevarat market is eqrsalto a single county. This
grouping is introduced totest the effects of state bank-
ing laws, population and space on local market con-
centration using an alternative criterion for defining
relevant markets.
57
Arkasasas, Indias_ia, Kes_itucky aad Tem_inessee allowed county—wide




The ol_iservatioma datefor the third groupis_igofn_iarketsis Decess_i—
her 31, 1981, Total depcssit data are from “ReportofCondition,”
Decersal_ier 31, 1981. Total deposits for cad_i ham_iking orgas_iization
in Mississippi on thisdate are listedaccording tothe locationofthe
organization’s main office andare not disaggregated according to
branches in different counties- Population and square miles of
countydata are from the 1980 Census ofPopulationsources listed
in footnote 15. When a market equals a single county, the size of
the market is equal to the square miles ofthe county. For those
markets in the second grouping that equal two or more whole
counties, thesize ofthe market is equal to the sum ofthe square
miles of the relevant counties,
The regression equation for each grouping is calcu-
lated in its natural log form, and the results are pre-
sented in table 4. As illustrated, the explanatory vari-
ableshavetheexpected signs. Foreach grouping, local
market concentration increases with decreases in
population and with the introduction of state banking
laws allowing multihank holding companies and lim-
ited branching. In tile second and third groupings,
where size of county is introduced, concentration in-
creases as the space withira the relevantly definedmar-
kets decreases.
Unfortunately, there is some variation ira the statis-
tical significance attached tothese variables inexplain-
ing levels of local market concentration. Population
avithin the relevantly defined market area is a signifi-
cant explanatory variable irrespective of the market
grouping chosen. This supports the conclusion of the
nonparametric test of population and concentration
presented in the preceding section.
The presence orabsence ofstate branching laws also
is significant in explaining local n_iarket concentration
using each market grouping. Its statistical significance
declines somewhat, however, when applied to the 120
Eighth District markets that cover one or more whole
counties, compared with its impact in the other two
groupings.
The performance ofthe size ofcountyand multihank
holding company variables is mixed. Size of county is
significant fir the 598 county markets grouping, hut
notfor the 120 Eighth District markets coveringone or
morewhole counties. Likewise, while multihank laold-
ingcon_ipany laws are statisticallysignificant inexplain-
ing concentration where markets are defined to he
single counties, they lose their explanatory power
when applied to the two groupings derived from tlae
Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis market definitions.
Tlaus, the results of the evaluations suggest that
branching laws tendto significantly increase local mar-
ket concentration. The impact of multihank holding
company laws is unclear; its significance depends upon
how the market is defined.
The results in table4 indicatethe problems iraherent
in determining useful definitioras of banking markets.
While the explanatory variablesperform best when tlae
markets are definedaloragsinglecounty lines, the cate-
gorical definition ofa county as a market is conceptu-
ally empty. It takes no account of the actual state of
interseller rivalry; yet, the notion of interseller rivalry
represents the underlying reason for sneasuring mar-
ket concentration in the first place.
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industries for merger activita - K’~This, coupled xs ith th
extent to wl_iich local banking markets fall snto ti_ic
“highly conceratrated” categor~ suggests that future
harak snergers and acquisitions may well he likel\
candidates for closer scrutiny hx the Department o
Justice. Ifthis hecon_iestht case, it will tirades score. ti_id
need for a clearer undc a tanding of the impact os_i
measuredconcentration in a snarket of statc branchiraf
arad snultihank holding comp-ina laws, popul-ition and
playsical space and alternatix e crateria for defining thai
market.
‘°JohnMorris, “Banking Had More Mergers to‘82 tlaan Any Othei
Group,” American Banker, Januara’ 19, 1983, p. 2.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
TI_ic majority of Eighth District local commercial
banking markets are highly concentrated, as the term
is defined bythe Department ofjustice. Also, relative-
ly higher levels of concentration c--an he expected in
local markets with smaller populations of users, and
located in states that allow limited branching. The
effects on concentration of state multibank l_iolding
compaaay laws and tlae pl_iysical size of a snarket, how-
ever, are asnl_iiguorss.
in 1982, banking as_id finance ranked first among 50
2